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Comparative Analysis of Bankruptcy Legal Provisions
from Mexico and the United States: Which
Legal System is More Attractive?
Jonatan Graham-Canedo *
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article identifies procedural and substantive similarities and
differences between Mexico's and the United States's bankruptcy laws
relevant and helpful in determining which of the two insolvency legal
systems is more attractive or successful. The comparative analysis is
pertinent because the United States and Mexico are commercial part-
ners under the North America Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),
with a current overall economic exchange of over three hundred bil-
lion dollars per year.' Because of this strong commercial relationship,
U.S. companies commonly conduct part of their business in Mexico
and have assets, suppliers, and employees within Mexico.
A significant economic reality connects both countries; thus, when a
transnational company of either nation becomes financially distressed,
it is convenient to recognize insolvency laws of both countries mutu-
ally and to harmonize their procedural and substantive provisions.
Harmonization maximizes the value of the estate for all creditors, and
simplifies procedural and substantive law. 2 With harmonization, cross-
border investments would be more secure in the event a company be-
comes economically distressed and has assets located in Mexico and
the United States.3
In 2000, Mexican Federal Congress passed a new insolvency law,
Ley de Concursos Mercantiles ("Concursos Law"). 4 This law governs
* Master of Laws (LL.M) at Harvard Law School, Class 2007; Abogado at Escuela Libre de
Derecho (Mexico City), Class 2004. Comments are welcome at jgrahamcanedo@post.harvard.
edu.
1. This number is the sum of importations and exportations between the United States and
Mexico during 2005. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geograffa e Informitica [National Insti-
tute of Statistics, Geography, and Information], http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/
rutinas/ept.asp?t=tinfll6&c=9231 (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
2. Emilie Beavers, Bankruptcy Law Harmonization in the NAFTA Countries: The Case of the
United States and Mexico, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 965, 966 (2003).
3. Id.
4. Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [L.C.M.] [Law of Commercial Insolvency], Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n [D.O.], 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.).
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cross-border insolvency cases,5 and its provisions on said matter incor-
porate the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's
("UNCITRAL's") Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency ("Model
Law"). 6 Actually, Mexico was one of the many Latin American coun-
tries that amended their bankruptcy laws during late 1990s and the
first years of this new millennium pursuant to the recommendations of
UNCITRAL's Model Law. 7 "This trend of amending or reviewing the
regional insolvency laws, [was] a reaction to the financial and eco-
nomic condition of Latin America's economies as well as an ever-in-
creasing number of corporations under distress" during the 1990s. 8 "It
[was] also a response to a global impetus of trying to save troubled
companies rather than see them in liquidation." 9
II. PROCEDURAL BANKRUPTCY LAW COMPARISON
In Mexico, there is a single insolvency process for merchants, both
individuals and legal entities, in distress. That process is governed by
the Concursos Law and is known as Concurso Mercantil ("Concurso
Process"). 10 The Concurso Process consists of two consecutive stages:
(i) the conciliation stage, of which the main purpose is facilitating the
reorganization of debtors' debt in order to preserve their businesses as
going concerns; and (ii) the liquidation stage, of which the main pur-
pose is terminating merchants' businesses, selling their assets, and,
with the proceeds derived from the sales, paying as much as possible
of debtor's debt and equity."
In the United States the main types of formal procedures for com-
panies in financial distress are Chapter Eleven of the Bankruptcy
5. Id.
6. Id. See also UNCITRAL, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/insolvency/1997Model.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
Adopted by UNCITRAL on 30 May 1997, the Model Law is designed to assist States to
equip their insolvency laws with a modern, harmonized and fair framework to address
more effectively instances of cross-border insolvency. Those instances include cases
where the insolvent debtor has assets in more than one State or where some of the
creditors of the debtor are not from the State where the insolvency proceeding is taking
place.
Id.
7. See generally Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Corporate Debt Restructuring in Latin America:
New Developments-New Opportunities?, 16 INT'L Co. & COM. L. REV. 254 (2005).
8. Id. at 262.
9. Id.
10. Alejandro Sainz & Manuel Ruiz-de-Chtvez, Chapter 27: Mexico, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CORPORATE RECOVERY AND INSOLVENCY 2007 155, 155
(Global Legal Group 2007), available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadminlPublications/pdf/1240.
pdf.
11. Id.
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Code, which allows for regulated reorganization; 12 Chapter Seven,
which provides for liquidation; 13 and Chapter Fifteen, which regulates
cross-border insolvency cases involving U.S. courts. 14
Mexico and the United States follow a universal approach to inter-
national bankruptcy cases.' 5 The Concursos Law recognizes foreign
insolvency proceedings; 16 as a result, a foreign court may exercise ju-
risdiction over the property and the business of a foreign merchant
located within the Mexican territory. The Concursos Law also recog-
nizes foreign representatives and foreign creditors who have the same
rights and access as Mexican creditors do in bankruptcy proceedings. 17
Chapter Fifteen of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code recognizes foreign insol-
vency procedures and "balance[s] the right of U.S. courts to adminis-
ter assets of a debtor with ties to the United States with the rights of
foreign courts with respect to assets of the same debtor." 18
As a consequence of the above described legal rules, Mexico and
the United States are open to judicial cooperation in insolvency mat-
ters involving both countries; they allow domestic courts to initiate
bankruptcy procedures concurrent to foreign proceedings. 19 Hence,
U.S. and Mexican courts have the legal capacity to cooperate in joint
bankruptcy proceedings. 20 In fact, said cooperation capability has al-
ready been proven. 21 An example is the Satdlites Mexicanos
("Satmex") restructure proceeding, which was managed by a Mexican
Federal Court and a United States Bankruptcy Court in New York.22
The concliliador (or conciliator in English) appointed in the Mexican
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2007).
13. §§ 701-85.
14. §§ 1501-32. Chapter 15 incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency, supra note 6.
15. Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31, 32 (2001)
("Under [pure] universalism, the bankruptcy regime of the debtor firm's home country would
govern worldwide .... That regime [would] have extraterritorial reach to treat all of the debtor's
assets and claimants ....").
16. Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [L.C.M.] [Law of Commercial Insolvency], arts. 278-285,
292-303, Diario Oficial de ]a Federaci6n [DO.], 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.).
17. Id.
18. Karen E. Wagner, Chapter 40: USA, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL
GUIDE TO: CORPORATE RECOVERY AND INSOLVENCY 2007 228, 231 (Global Legal Group 2007),
available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/1253.pdf.
19. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-32 (2007) with L.C.M. arts. 278-285, 292-303.
20. Id.
21. See In re Sat6lites Mexicanos, S.A., de C.V., No. 05-13862 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed May
2005).
22. Thomas S. Heather, Mexican Insolvency Put to the Test, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW
REVIEW, May 2006, at 1, available at http://www.whitecase.com/files[Publication/6867af60-98c9-
42f3-b66f-lc6f9debbada[Presentation/PubicationAttachment/c846cd7-23d9-4cec-8c4-e6e6
acc73/articleMexicanlnsolvencyTHeather.pdf.
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process, Thomas Heather, 23 described the case as notable because of
the cross-border cooperation and stated the "two judges worked to-
gether, informally, but remarkably well."'24
III. SUBSTANTIVE BANKRUPTCY LAW COMPARISON
As described above, procedural harmonization of insolvency laws in
the United States and Mexico has been achieved satisfactorily because
both countries have adopted UNCITRAL's Model Law.25 There are,
however, important differences in substantive matters of their respec-
tive bankruptcy laws. 26 This Article analyzes three bankruptcy sub-
stantive subjects, each regulated in different ways by Mexico and the
United States through their insolvency laws; this analysis serves as a
basis to determine which legal system is more efficient or attractive.
A. Creditors' Priority
Mexico and the United States have different priority rankings for
payment to the impaired creditors in the event of a debtor's liquida-
tion.27 This difference is very relevant to establishing which bank-
ruptcy legal system is more attractive. Both countries "diverge
substantially in their treatment of labor and, to a lesser extent, tax
claims within the bankruptcy estate. ' 28 In Mexico, wages for the last
two working years prior to the date of the declaration of insolvency
and employees' claims for labor indemnifications have priority over
any other category of creditors' claims.29 This rule places labor credits
in a dominant position. Besides this rule, the Concursos Law follows a
traditional ranking of credits: Expenses incurred in the administration
of secured assets are paid first.30 Then, secured creditors are paid with
the proceeds from the sale of mortgaged or pledged assets.31 If the
value of said assets is not sufficient to cover the debt, then the secured
23. Mr. Thomas Heather is a partner of White & Case LLP and was appointed conciliator of
Satmex.
24. Satmex Reaches Milestone, LATIN LAWYER, Dec. 14, 2006, at 9.
25. See supra notes 6, 14 and accompanying text.
26. Beavers, supra note 3, at 968.
27. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2007) with Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [L.C.M.] [Law of
Commercial Insolvency], art. 224 (I), Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 12 de Mayo de 2000
(Mex.).
28. Beavers, supra note 3, at 988.
29. Sainz & Ruiz-de-Chivez, supra note 10, at 158. See also Constituci6n Politica de los Es-
tados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], art. 123 (A) (XXIII), Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 5
de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [L.C.M.] [Law of Commercial Insol-
vency], art. 224 (I), Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.).
30. Sainz & Ruiz-de-Ch~ivez, supra note 10, at 158.
31. Id.
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creditors are considered as unsecured for the balance due.32 Common
unsecured creditors of commercial transactions collect pro rata from
the outstanding balance.33 Finally, noncommercial creditors have the
right to collect from any remaining amount.34
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code also follows a traditional ranking of
claims, where secured creditors have first priority with respect to their
security interests.35 The Code establishes an "administrative" priority
in which certain claims, such as fees of professionals involved in the
bankruptcy and post-petition financings, are paid before other un-
secured claims.36 Unsecured creditors come last, and they are priority
ranked by statute. 37 For example, pursuant to Section 507, wages
earned within 180 days prior to filing have priority over other general
unsecured creditors, but such claims are capped at certain amount.38
In the United States, labor claims never get priority over secured
creditors. 39
Tax credits also receive a different priority ranking in the United
States compared to Mexico.40 In Mexico, the government's tax claims
have priority over unsecured claims, but they are collected after pay-
ment to the secured creditors. 41 However, such claims are not man-
aged before the same courts that carry on the bankruptcy procedures;
instead, they are determined and collected by administrative courts.42
The rationale for separating tax claims is taxes are considered a cost
legally attached to the operation of a company. Article 69 of the Con-
cursos Law, however, provides any proceeding initiated against the
debtor to collect taxes will be suspended while the Concurso Process
is pending. 43 Tax claims in the United States do not receive priority
over secured claims.44 They are unsecured credits and are even ranked
lower than labor credits.45
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2007).
36. § 507(A)(1)(c).
37. § 507.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2007) with Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [L.C.M.] [Law
of Commercial Insolvency], art. 69, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 12 de Mayo de 2000
(Mex.).
41. Sainz & Ruiz-de-Chdvez, supra note 10, at 158.
42. Id.
43. Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [L.C.M.] [Law of Commercial Insolvency], art. 69, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2007).
45. § 507.
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There are various consequences deriving from the dissimilar ap-
proaches the two countries take with respect to the priority of credi-
tors. An important one is funds deriving from the liquidation of the
debtor's estate will be distributed differently, depending on where the
main proceeding is conducted. It is clear creditors, particularly se-
cured creditors, will be better off if the main proceeding is managed
by a U.S. Bankruptcy Court, while employees will prefer the proceed-
ing takes place in Mexico. Therefore, when possible, creditors will
seek to file a bankruptcy petition with a U.S. court and will argue that
proceeding should be the main one.
UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, drafted with
the objective of proposing harmonization of substantive bankruptcy
law, establishes nine "key objectives" of insolvency regimes.46 Key ob-
jective number eight, "[r]eorganization of existing creditor rights and
establishment of clear rules for ranking of priority claims," expresses
that free market conditions should govern and be determinative of the
rank of credits. 47 It states: "To the greatest extent possible, those pri-
orities should be based upon commercial bargains and not reflect so-
cial and political concerns that have the potential to distort the
outcome of insolvency." 48
However, UNCITRAL also recognizes that insolvency laws must
balance the interests of the debtors' stakeholders against the relevant
social, political, and other policy considerations that have an impact
on the economic and legal goals of insolvency proceedings. 49 Thus,
UNCITRAL acknowledges the importance of making insolvency laws
compatible with the legal and social values of the society of the coun-
try in which they are based.50 In the case of Mexico, labor rights are
deemed to be a major victory of the working social class and of Mex-
46. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW 10-14
(2005), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722-Ebook.pdf. The
Commission notes the following objectives:
[1] Provision of certainty in the market to promote economic stability and growth[;] ...
[2] Maximization of value of assets[;] ... [3] Striking a balance between maximization
and reorganization[;] .. .[4] Ensuring equitable treatment of similarly situated credi-
tors[;] ... [5] Provision for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of insolvency[;]...
[6] Preservation of the insolvency estate to allow equitable distributions to creditors[;]
... [7] Ensuring a transparent and predictable insolvency law that contains incentives
for gathering and dispensing information[;] .. .[8] Reorganization of existing creditor
rights and establishment of clear rules for ranking priority claims[;]... [and 9] Establish-
ment of a framework for cross-border insolvency.
Id. at v (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id.
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ico as a whole. 51 Moreover, such rights have been incorporated in Ar-
ticle 123 of the Mexican Constitution, making them "fundamental
rights" of the labor class.5 2 That Article represents one of the bastions
of the constitution.53
UNCITRAL suggests the way to avoid forum shopping is by har-
monizing insolvency laws and, specifically, recommends labor claims
be treated as common unsecured credits. 54 Although, from a prag-
matic perspective, these suggestions are sound, the United States
should recognize and respect Mexico's legitimate commitment to its
working social class. Both countries need to work together and find
solutions to prevent forum shopping by creditors. Perhaps, one possi-
ble way to do this is by establishing differential treatment of Mexican
labor credits. For example, the first payment could be given its current
priority, but capped at an amount, with the outstanding balance, if
any, considered as common unsecured credit.
Finally, with respect to the creditors' priority, another impact of giv-
ing first priority to labor claims is it deters potential lenders from fi-
nancing the debtor under reorganization. The United States strongly
foments the access to credit by debtors subject to a bankruptcy pro-
cess. 55 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is designed to encourage post-peti-
tion lending by giving these lenders special protection.56 Debtors can,
for instance, offer to post-petition lenders security interests over the
property they acquire after the bankruptcy is filed.57 On the other
hand, Mexico's priority to labor claims acts as a disincentive to give
credits to debtors under financial distress.
B. The Option for a Cramdown
The U.S. and Mexico bankruptcy proceedings provide different
mechanisms to confirm a reorganization plan ("plan"). One of the
mechanisms that differs is a "cramdown," or the capacity of confirm-
ing a plan under adverse circumstances. Mexico does not have an op-
tion for a cramdown. The Concursos Law does not grant an option to
confirm a plan once all classes of creditors have rejected the one pro-
51. See Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], art. 123 (A) (XXIII),
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW (2005),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdftenglish/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf.
55. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDI-
TORS 459 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2006).
56. Id.
57. 11 U.S.C § 364(c) (2007).
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posed. In the United States, on the other hand, if a plan satisfies the
requirements of Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, it may be
confirmed, even if the same was previously rejected by the impaired
creditors' classes participating in the bankruptcy proceeding.58 A
debtor who wishes to cramdown a plan must count with at least the
consent of one class of the impaired creditors and fulfill the requisites
of Section 1129(b).5 9 Generally, these requirements are 1) debtors
must receive as much as they would in liquidation (the "best interest
of creditors" test); 2) no junior creditor shall receive any distribution
before a senior class is paid in full (the "absolute priority rule"); and
3) the plan must be fair and equitable.60
In the case of Mexico, the Concursos Law permits a debtor to reach
a plan without the unanimous vote of all creditors; yet, certain
mandatory percentages of votes and other legal requirements must be
met. 61 However, it is important to note that in Mexico, creditors with
secured interests can never be crammed down.62 Article 160 of the
Concursos Law provides that all secured creditors who do not ap-
prove a plan may foreclose their guaranties, unless the plan estab-
lishes they will be paid in full, including principal and accessories due,
in terms of the contract they entered into with the debtor.63
The inability to cramdown means that the debtor is left with fewer
legal options. However, cramming down a plan is a last shot for the
debtor, and it usually turns negotiations between the debtor and the
creditors into adversarial confrontations. Furthermore, "the process
[is] time consuming and expensive. '64 Perhaps when the debtor knows
his best alternative to a negotiated agreement is liquidation, he will
make his best effort to reaching a plan that satisfies the necessary ma-
jorities in each class of impaired creditors. Thus, the fact no cramdown
option exists in Mexico does not necessarily mean that the Mexican
insolvency proceeding is less attractive to management of companies
in distress.
58. 11 U.S.C § 1129(b) (2005).
59. Id.
60. WARREN & LAWRENCE, supra note 55, at 655 ("Section 1129(b)(2) sets forth minimum
requirements for a plan to be found fair and equitable, leaving to courts the imposition of any
additional requirements in particular cases."); see also Wagner, supra note 18, at 231.
61. Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [L.C.M.] [Law of Commercial Insolvency], Diario Oficial
de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.).
62. L.C.M. art. 160.
63. Id.
64. Wagner, supra note 18, at 231.
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C. Control of the Debtor Throughout the Insolvency Process
The Mexican Concursos Law and Chapter Eleven of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code authorize the debtor to remain in control of the business
after the bankruptcy has been filed. 65 In the United States, the
debtor's management will continue in control of the administration as
a debtor-in-possession, absent a legitimate and valid request by credi-
tors that a trustee should be appointed to manage the estate.66 When a
trustee is appointed, it replaces the debtor's management and takes
control of the debtor's assets and business. 67 Once liquidation is initi-
ated under Chapter Seven, a trustee shall be appointed to liquidate
the company's assets and make distributions to creditors. 68
Under the Concursos Law, debtors may continue in possession of
the estate; however, a conciliator (or concliliador in Spanish) will al-
ways be appointed, and he will have the responsibility of reviewing
the debtor's management and accounting.69 The appointed conciliator
may, at any time, request the court remove the debtor from the ad-
ministration of the business in order to protect the estate. 70 In the
event that the liquidation (or quiebra in Spanish) stage initiates, the
debtor (and thus, if applicable, the board of directors) will be removed
from the administration and a receiver (or sindico in Spanish) will be
designated by the bankruptcy court. 71 The receiver will have the
broadest legal authority to carry on the liquidation of the debtor.
72
Thus, in both countries the general rule is debtors maintain posses-
sion of the estate during the reorganization proceeding. 73 In the
United States, the impaired creditors may request the removal of the
debtor from the administration;74 whereas, in Mexico, only the concili-
ator has that prerogative. 75 This means, in the United States, the im-
paired creditors will have an incentive to directly monitor the debtor's
65. Compare 11 U.S.C §§ 1101-74 (2007) with Sainz & Ruiz-de-Chivez, supra note 10, at 157.
66. § 1104. Disputes among creditors are common in cases where some of them believe that
the debtor-in-possession operations will only favor one particular creditor (normally the largest
and most powerful) to the exclusion of all other creditors. See WARREN & LAWRENCE, supra
note 55, at 437. An example of these disputes can be found at In re Marvel Entm't Group, Inc.,
140 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1998) (in which a trustee was appointed after a creditor obtained control of
the debtor's board of directors and the appointment was upheld).
67. § 1104.
68. Wagner, supra note 18, at 230.
69. Sainz & Ruiz-de-Chivez, supra note 10, at 157.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Compare id. with In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1225 (3d Cir. 1989) ("It is
settled that the appointment of a trustee should be the exception, rather than the rule.").
74. 11 U.S.C § 1104 (a) (2007).
75. Sainz & Ruiz-de-Chlvez, supra note 10, at 157.
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administration; while in Mexico, the conciliator has a legal obligation
to perform that function. 76 Also, in both countries, the debtor will be
removed from the administration once the liquidation proceeding be-
gins.77 Finally, both countries give broad discretionary faculty to
judges in deciding whether the debtor should be removed from the
administration of the estate.78
IV. CONCLUSION
Mexico and the United States have modern bankruptcy laws incor-
porating most recommendations contained in the UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Board Insolvency. 79 Procedurally, their laws have al-
ready been harmonized, and there are no substantial differences that
would make one jurisdiction more efficient or attractive to either
debtors or creditors. Both countries follow a universal approach and,
therefore, promote judicial cooperation in insolvency proceedings.
The U.S. and Mexican substantive bankruptcy law differences deter
creditors from filing bankruptcy petitions in Mexico and are an incen-
tive for them to persuade courts to declare the principal proceeding is
to be managed by U.S. courts. On the other hand, employees of debt-
ors in distress will find it more attractive when the main insolvency
processes take place in Mexico.
The most significant difference between the two countries' substan-
tive bankruptcy laws is the different ranking they give to creditors.
The fact that labor and tax claims have a dominant priority in Mexico
has adverse consequences to both the United States and Mexico. It
foments forum shopping and it also discourages post-petition financ-
ing to debtors subject to an insolvency proceeding in Mexico. For this
reason, the two countries need to work together to harmonize their
laws, but such harmonization must acknowledge their different eco-
nomic and political ideologies.
Finally, debtors subject to reorganization proceedings in Mexico do
not have the option to cramdown impaired creditors to accept a plan.
However, the absence of a cramdown alternative might actually pro-
mote amicable negotiations between debtors and creditors.
76. Id.
77. 11 U.S.C § 702 (2007); WARREN & LAWRENCE, supra note 55, at 149; Ley de Concursos
Mercantiles [L.C.M.I [Law of Commercial Insolvency], art. 178, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
[D.O.], 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.).
78. NANCY C. DREHER & JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 954 (Thomson West,
5th ed. 2007); Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [L.C.M.] [Law of Commercial Insolvency], Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.).
79. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, http://www.uncitral.org/unci-
tral/en/uncitraltexts/insolvency/1997Model.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
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